Introduction
During the nal two decades of the 20th century, nearly all industria l countries engaged in supply-sid e economic reforms. New Zealand is often hailed as an outstandin g example of this trend, and indeed the Reserve Bank of New Zealand recently observed that the reform programme initiated in the mid-1980s 'eventually transformed the New Zealand economy from one of the most interventionis t in the OECD to one of the most open and market-based' (Conway & Orr, 2000, p. 8) . The extent of the reforms is impressive. Within a year of a change of government in July 1984, interest rates were deregulated, international capital restrictions had been removed, the currency was oating freely in foreign exchange markets and most agricultural subsidies and tax incentives were being phased out. Over the next decade and a half, domestic market regulations were comprehensively reformed in favour of contestabilit y and competition, all import quotas were eliminated and a timetable was set for reducing tariffs to zero by 2006. In 1989, price stability was designated the sole statutory objective of monetary policy (New Zealand was the rst country to adopt this reform). In 1991, labour legislation was radically transformed from a corporatist, unionbased framework to a decentralised, individual-base d contracts system. Since 1994, the Fiscal Responsibilit y Act has prohibited budget de cits 'on average, over a reasonable period of time'. Approximately US$10 billion worth of state assets were privatised between 1988 and 1999, and all remaining central government trading departments have been restructured along the lines of private sector corporations. Social welfare income support entitlements were signi cantly cut back in 1991, while income tax rates were reduced in 1996 and again in 1998.
New Zealand economists have for the most part been optimistic about the success of these reforms. It is generally agreed, for example, that there have been substantial improvements in the productivit y of many sectors (particularly in the government trading departments that were corporatised or privatised) , in the range of goods and services available to consumers (permitted, for example, by reduced import protection), in the exibility of markets to respond ef ciently to economic shocks (including the labour market under the Employment Contracts Act of 1991) and in macroeconomic stability (particularly price stability and scal balance, although there remain some concerns about New Zealand's persistent balance of payments de cit). More controversial, however, is the claim by many proponents that the reforms also led to higher growth in economic activity and aggregate productivity, and to lower rates of unemployment and poverty.
Two authoritative studies have been particularly important in promoting this claim for economists outside New Zealand.
1 Listing 'growth, productivity, income distributio n and unemployment' as the ' nal outcomes' by which the reforms could be evaluated, Silverstone et al. (1996, p. 20) acknowledge that the evidence on these four objectives is mixed. Nevertheless, their assessment is 'cautiously optimistic that the reforms have contributed to sustainable economic growth'; they report 'distinctiv e gains [in productivity] after 1984 across all 21 sectors'; they consider that 'the outcome with respect to unemployment is also surprising, and to some extent, welcome'; and they express a quali ed opinion that 'the impact of the reforms on income distributio n has been less signi cant than might have been anticipated'. While acknowledging that New Zealanders have not always been as enthusiastic as overseas commentators about the experience, these authors conclude that 'New Zealand's economic reform process may still rank as one of the more successful by world standards, with the potential to improve economic wellbeing compared to the outcomes from an unreformed economy' (Silverstone et al., 1996, p. 23) .
The second study is also positive about these ultimate objectives. Evans et al. (1996 Evans et al. ( , p. 1982 report that economic growth between June 1991 and June 1995 'was almost treble the per capita growth rate of the previous 17 years leaving the level of per capita GDP 6.8 percent higher in June 1995 than it would have been had the pre-1984 growth rate continued'.
2 They also suggest, rather more cautiously, that 'labour productivit y growth rose for a period following the ECA [Employment Contracts Act]' while noting that 'employment grew strongly in the post-1991 period indicating that the post-ECA productivit y boost was not achieved as a result of a labor shake-out, as occurred prior to 1991' (Evans et al., 1996 (Evans et al., , p. 1881 . Their article recognises 'some evidence of a widening dispersion of household incomes during the period of the bene t cuts and the early response to the ECA' but argues that 'the strong employment growth since 1991 now appears to be favoring lower socioeconomic groups' (Evans et al., 1996 (Evans et al., , p. 1882 . The article concludes: 'After decades of policy errors and investment blunders, New Zealand appears to have nally diagnosed its predicament appropriately and is on a trajectory to maintain its economy as a consistent high performer among the OECD' (Evans et al., 1996 (Evans et al., , p. 1895 .
The purpose of this paper is to present statistical evidence which challenges these optimistic reports of the New Zealand experiment. The rst sort of statistica l evidence presented draws comparisons with Australia, whose economy has strong structural and other similarities with the New Zealand economy, but whose policy makers adopted a more moderate approach to economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s. This paper shows that New Zealand sacri ced a large volume of real per capita GDP between 1987 and 1998 compared with Australia; that New Zealand's unemployment rate moved from well below that of Australia before 1988 to comparable values thereafter; and that labour productivit y growth in New Zealand has been considerably below that of Australia since 1992, after similar rates for the previous 14 years. The second sort of statistical evidence utilised draws on a recent New Zealand study to demonstrate that the per capita real income of low-income households in New Zealand fell in absolute terms between 1984 and 1996.
Section 2 of the paper provides an examination of longer-run annual per capita real GDP data for Australia and New Zealand to justify the use of the former country's experience as a benchmark for New Zealand's reforms. Section 3 then presents quarterly data from 1978 to 1998 to describe how New Zealand's per capita real GDP path fell well below that of Australia after 1987. Section 4 partitions the data of section 3 into its supply-side components, showing that in the rst period of the reforms the divergence was due to changes in employment ratios, while in the second period the cause was changes in labour productivity. Section 5 uses results on New Zealand's income distributio n reported by Podder & Chatterjee (1998) to demonstrate the loss of real spending power experienced by low-income households after 1984. Section 6 is a brief conclusion.
Comparing Australia and New Zealand
Discussions about the impact of the reform programme on ultimate goals such as real economic growth are frequently hindered by disagreements about what is a sensible counterfactual (see, for example, the exchange between Dalziel (1998) and Evans et al. (1998) ). A simple comparison of pre-reform and post-reform outcomes is not reasonable, for example, since there is no suggestion that New Zealand would have engaged in no reforms had it not embraced the comprehensive programme adopted after 1984. As the head of the OECD Economics and Statistics Department at the time has observed, 'at different stages from the late 1970s onwards, and to an extent that few people anticipated before the event, governments in all [OECD] countries chose to follow broadly a path of market-oriented economic reform' (Henderson, 1996, pp. 7-8) . The decision to initiate reforms is not what marked New Zealand's reform programme as unique, but rather its extent, as Henderson (1996, p. 13 ) goes on to explain:
In no other OECD country has there been so systematic an attempt at the same time (1) to rede ne and limit the role of government, and (2) to make public agencies and their operations more effective, more transparent, and more accountable. It is this important extra dimension, as well as the range and scope of reforms that have more obvious counterparts elsewhere, that gives the New Zealand programme its special character.
The question to ask, therefore, is what might have happened if New Zealand had implemented reforms on a scale more commonly accepted in other developed countries. The approach taken in this paper is to take New Zealand's closest OECD neighbour, Australia, as providing a reasonable counterfactual. Not only do Australia and New Zealand share many similarities in economic institution s as former colonies of the UK, but the two countries are united by a free trade agreement and by unrestricted ows of labour and capital across the Tasman. The two economies are not structurally identical, of course, but this section argues that the divergence in per capita real output from the mid-1980s is so large compared with the pattern before 1984 that the qualitative conclusions described in the introductio n are easily justi ed. Figure 1 presents the relevant data, expressed in natural logs to allow distances on the vertical axis to be interpreted as approximate percentage changes from the base year 1949/50. 3 The top series is Australian data, while the bottom series is New Zealand raw data (the middle series adjusts the New Zealand data in a way that will be explained shortly). These data show a small gap of about 5.5 percentage points emerging between 1949/50 and 1966/67, which had jumped to 15 percentage points by 1968/69. The difference then stabilised and showed some tendency to close, until 1977/78, when there was another large increase, to 21 percentage points. The gap had closed back to 17 percentage points by 1984/85, but then nearly doubled over the next 8 years, to 31.5 percentage points in 1992/93. There was strong growth in New Zealand in 1993/94, but since then the gap has continued to widen, reaching 38 percentage points in 1998/99.
Thus, in the period between 1949/50 and 1984/85, the two economies grew at similar rates, punctuated by two large, adverse shocks to New Zealand's per capita real GDP in 1967/68 and 1977/78. 4 The causes of the shocks are well understood (see, for example, Dalziel & Lattimore, 1999 , chapter 1). First, the international price of wool fell in real terms by over 20% in 1967, and by a further 20% in 1968. Since wool accounted for 30% of New Zealand exports at the time, these events had a profound impact on its terms of trade, and the economy experienced a sharp recession. The early 1970s also saw large uctuations in the terms of trade. Between 1970/71 and 1973/74, large rises in world commodity prices meant that the terms of trade index rose nearly 50% in just 3 years. A year later, after the rst oil shock, the index had fallen back to its 1970/71 value, and it fell a further 15% in 1975/76. Initially, the government sought to offset this impact through expansionary scal and monetary policies, but these could not prevent the New Zealand economy from moving into recession in 1976/77 and then contracting sharply in 1977/78.
These observations can be summarised with a simple econometric estimation of the correlation between the Australian and New Zealand series in 
Australia and New Zealand, 1978-98
Figure 2 presents quarterly index data for Australia's and New Zealand's per capita real GDP (seasonally adjusted) from March 1978 to December 1998, with both series scaled to equal 100 for the calendar year 1978. The graphs show the two economies following a very similar growth path until the end of 1981. The world recession of 1982 then had a larger impact on Australia than New Zealand, but Australia had made up the lost ground by September 1985. New Zealand experienced a temporary two-quarter surge in GDP in 1986 (associated with the introductio n of its indirect tax, the Goods & Services Tax, on 1 October); otherwise, the two series are again similar until June 1987, which marks the beginning of a widening divergence between the Australian and the New Zealand data.
The divergence proceeded in three stages (see Table 1 for a summary). In the rst stage, New Zealand's per capita real GDP remained remarkably at (apart from another temporary increase associated with the increase in the Goods & Services Tax from 10% to 12.5% in August 1989) while the Australian economy continued to grow. Taking the Australian peak, this stage ended in June 1990. In the second stage, both economies moved into deep and lengthy recessions, with neither country back at its June 1990 level until the March (Australia) or June (New Zealand) quarter of 1993. In the third stage, Australian growth rates were remarkably stable at about 3% per annum, while the New Zealand growth rate steadily slowed and then turned negative with the onset of a short recession in the rst 6 months of 1998 (in part because New Zealand demonstrated considerably less resilience than Australia after its rst major international shock in the post-reform period-the Asia currency crisis beginning in July 1997).
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The cumulative effect of this divergence is very large. By 1998, the value of the real output index for Australia in Fig. 2 
Employment Ratios and Labour Productivity, 1978-98
The previous section demonstrated the weak performance of the New Zealand economy compared with that of Australia after 1987. In this section, the per capita real GDP data are partitione d into their supply-sid e components to address the question of what caused this divergence. In particular, the analysis demonstrates that there were two factors involved, with labour force characteristics being more important between 1987 and 1991, and labour productivity being more important between 1991 and 1998.
As a simple matter of de nitions, it is possible to categorise per capita real GDP (denoted Y/P) as follows:
where Y is real GDP, P is population, F is full-time equivalent employment, E is employment, L is labour force and W is working age population . Thus per capita real GDP is made up of labour force productivity (Y/F), the ratio of full-time equivalent employment to total employment (F/E, which might be called one minus the casualisation rate), the ratio of total employment to the labour force (E/L, which is one minus the unemployment rate), the participation rate (L/W) and the ratio of working age people to the total population (W/P).
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Figures 3-7 present comparative data for each of these components of per capita output, taken in reverse order. Figure 3 reveals that New Zealand has a younger population than Australia, in the sense that the proportion of the population aged 15 years and over is lower. This difference, however, has fallen from 5 percentage points in 1978 to 3 percentage points in 1998, which should have allowed New Zealand to increase its per capita output relative to Australia, everything else staying the same. Figure 4 shows that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the participation rate in Australia was below that of New Zealand. From 1985, participation rates increased in Australia, while after 1988 they fell in New Zealand, so that this statistic had very similar values in the two countries between June 1989 and September 1992. Since then, a rising participation rate in New Zealand has led to the re-emergence of a positive gap, which again should have allowed New Zealand to increase its per capita output relative to Australia, everything else staying the same. At the beginning of the series in Fig. 5 , the unemployment rate in New Zealand was about 1.5%, compared with about 6.3% in Australia. Over the next decade, rising unemployment in New Zealand saw the two series converge at the end of 1988, and follow a similar pattern from 1989 to 1991. Unemployment was generally below Australian unemployment after 1991 until the very end of the sample, but not by as much as in the period before 1988. Thus, New Zealand's average unemployment rate moved from being well below that of Australia before 1988 to comparable values thereafter. Figure 6 shows that both countries have experienced an increase in the proportion of part-time work (implying a falling ratio of full-time equivalent to total employment). The New Zealand data, which are not seasonally adjusted, are a little higher than the Australian data, and if anything this gap has increased slightly over the sample period.
8 Once more, this should have allowed New Zealand to increase its relative per capita output, everything else staying the same.
The most surprising data are in Fig. 7 , which shows real GDP divided by the number of full-time equivalent workers employed, rescaled so that the 1978 calendar year values equal 100. From March 1978 to September 1984, the two series are almost indistinguishable . For the next 4 years, New Zealand's labour productivit y index lies below that of Australia (except for the quarters affected by the introductio n of the Goods & Services Tax in the middle of 1986), but catches up by the beginning of 1989. The series are then indistinguishabl e again until December 1990, after which labour productivit y growth falls away in New Zealand compared with Australia (especially after December 1991). Over the last 8 years of the sample, the gap increased substantially , so that between 1990 and 1998 workers in Australia increased their productivity by 21.9 percentage points whereas the increase in New Zealand over the same period was only 5.2 percentage points. Figure 7 shows that since 1992 labour productivity growth in New Zealand has been considerably below that of Australia, after similar rates for the previous 14 years. This observation raises profound questions for New Zealand policy makers about the effectiveness of labour market reforms intended to raise labour productivity. 9 The Employment Contracts Act of 1991 radically decentralised employer-employee negotiations , and led to signi cantly lower unionisatio n rates among the New Zealand workforce. Nevertheless, the introductio n of the Act appears to have marked the end of a long period of strong comparability between New Zealand and Australian labour productivit y growth, to New Zealand's great disadvantage. Recognition of this fact was one of the considerations leading a new Labour-led coalition government (elected in late 1999) to replace the Act with the more corporatist Employment Relations Act of 2000.
Income Distribution, 1984-96
There is general acceptance that income inequalities in New Zealand widened after the introductio n of the reforms. 10 Podder & Chatterjee (1998) , for example, Table 2 . Podder & Chatterjee's (1998, pp. 11-12) method involved assigning each individual of the population with the per capita income of their household, and then ranking all individuals from lowest to highest income. If si denotes the income share of decile i, if yi is the per capita income of all individuals in decile i and if y is the aggregate per capita income of all deciles, then it is easily shown that:
The next step is to calculate aggregate per capita income, y, for each of the three years in Podder & Chatterjee's (1998) study. Because income rather than output is being analysed, gross national product (GNP) is the more appropriate macroeconomic variable to use, rather than GDP. Table 3 presents the calculation of per capita real GNP used in this paper. This statistic actually fell in value between the 8 years of 1983/84 and 1991/92, con rming the substantial sacri ce entailed by the reforms. By 1995/96, it had recovered to a level 9.4% above its 1983/84 level. Table 4 presents the changes in average real incomes calculated using Equation (2) and the data in Tables 2 and 3 . There was a substantial shift in New Zealand's income distributio n during the reform period. First, the lowest income deciles suffered a large loss of income during the depths of the recession in the early 1990s. The average income of the lowest decile in 1991/92 was 21.6% lower than in 1983/84, and that of the second decile was 10.3% lower. These two groups shared in the post-1991/92 recovery, but by 1995/96 their average incomes were still 8.7% and 4% lower than in 1983/84. Secondly, half of the New Zealand distribution had lower real incomes in 1995/96 than before the start of the reforms, and for 40% of the distributio n the loss of income was greater than 3%. These data support reports by a wide variety of community Tables 2 and 3 using Equation (2).
groups in New Zealand during the 1990s that poverty and social exclusion have caused widespread problems, particularly among low-income households with children (con rmed by Stephens et al., 2000, p. 31) . Finally, Table 4 shows that large gains were made at the top end of the income distributio n during the recovery that peaked in 1995/96. Compared with 1983/84, the average income of the top 10% had increased by more than one-quarter (26.5%). Note carefully that this result does not simply say that the income distribution in New Zealand widened during the course of its economic reforms. As is well known, income distributio n dispersion is a global phenomenon (see, for example, Dixon, 1998; Easton, 1996) . In New Zealand, however, it appears to have been accompanied in the 1980s and 1990s by a signi cant fall in the absolute amount of real purchasing power by the lowest-income groups. At the beginning of the reform process in New Zealand, a government-sponsore d Economic Summit Conference (ESC) agreed unanimously that the costs of economic adjustment 'should not be borne by the relatively disadvantaged', but 'policy should aim to minimise the impact of social and economic dislocation s on vulnerable groups and communities' (ESC, 1984, p. 304) . The data reveal that these objectives were not achieved. Evans et al. (1996 Evans et al. ( , p. 1895 concluded their review of New Zealand's reforms with the comment that 'New Zealand once again appears to be emerging as a laboratory from which results will animate economic debate and policy throughout the world'. The present paper reports from the laboratory that the New Zealand experiment did not succeed, despite achieving greater microeconomic ef ciency in some industrie s and obtaining its intermediate objectives of price stability and scal balance. Examining the ultimate objectives of the reforms, this paper has shown that: (1) New Zealand sacri ced a large volume of real per capita GDP after 1987; (2) its average unemployment rate increased substantiall y after 1988; (3) labour productivit y growth declined after 1992; and (4) the per capita real income of low-income households in 1996 was more than 3% lower in absolute terms than it had been in 1984.
Conclusion
Stoic defenders of the reforms can always argue that New Zealand's economic performance might have been even worse if it had not embarked on the comprehensive programme of reforms in 1984, or if it had implemented reform at a slower pace in line with other OECD countries. Such counterfactuals can never be disproved, of course, but it should be emphasised that the reforms were launched with very different objectives in mind. The Economic Summit Conference convened in September 1984 to endorse the necessity for reform began its unanimously approved communiqué with the following observation (ESC, 1984, p. 302 ):
Participants were aware of two seemingly contradictory facts. New Zealand has abundant resources to realise the reasonable economic and social objectives of all its people. Despite that, these aspirations have not always been ful lled. There is an unacceptable level of poverty. There are people in our community who have major dif culties with housing, health care, and meeting essential family needs. This failure to match resources and performance has not been a short term problem but rather a feature of the New Zealand economy for the last thirty years.
The hope in 1984 was that economic reform would reverse this trend of the previous 30 years. Seventeen years later, with higher unemployment and lower real incomes at the bottom end of New Zealand's income distribution , it is clear that the comprehensive reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s did not achieve that core objective.
